By Hu Bo
胡波
Recently, the US Department of Defense (DoD) issued a briefing, showcasing its achievements in implementing the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" through three aspects, which are, regional military force structure reform, unprecedented boost in investment in capabilities, and reinforcement of the mutual regional security objectives with its allies and partners. The US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said, "In this decisive decade, 2023 will be remembered as a decisive year for implementing US defense strategy in Asia."
近日，美国国防部发布简报，从改革美军的地区兵力结构、历史性加大对能力的投资和强化与盟国及伙伴的共同地区安全愿景三大方面，就推进落实“印太战略”为自己表功。美国国防部长奥斯汀说：“在这个决定性的十年中，2023年将被铭记为美国在亚洲实施防务战略的决定性一年”。
As part of the public relations efforts of the US DoD, this briefing aimed at demonstrating its prioritization and attention to the Indo-Pacific and winning domestic and overseas recognition, with a heavy dose of propaganda. In the briefing, the FY2024 defense budget of the country marks all-time high levels of an Indo-Pacific deterrence initiative budget at USD 9.1 billion, a defense research and development investment at USD 145 billion, and a defense procurement budget at USD 170 billion. However, given the incremental growth in the total US defense budget each year, and the prioritized strategic significance the country attaches to the Indo-Pacific region, the subsequent upswing of the above budgets is in line with expectations and still far from being "decisive". The US defense budget for FY2024 sets another record at USD 886 billion, an increase of nearly USD 30 billion from the previous fiscal year, and will continue to hit new highs in the future.
这份简报是美国国防部公共关系努力的一部分，目的是展示其对“印太”的聚焦和重视，赢得国内外对其推动“印太战略”的认可，宣传味道很重。在简报中，2024财年的国防预算与“印太战略”有关的印太威慑倡议91亿美元、国防研发投资1450亿美元和国防采购预算1700亿美元，均为历史最高。然而，考虑到美军国防预算的总盘子在逐年增加，“印太”又是最重要的战略地区，上述预算的水涨船高尚在预料之中，远谈不上“决定性”。2024财年美国的国防预算高达8860亿美元，较上一财年增加近300亿美元，再创历史新高，未来还会不断创新高。
The restructuring of force depolyments is also considered a major breakthrough, including reorganizing and deploying the first Marine Littoral Regiments in Japan, launching a series of new force deployment initiatives with Australia, adding four new rotating bases in the Philippines under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), concluding the Defense Cooperation Agreement with Papua New Guinea and strengthening strategic deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.
兵力结构调整也被认为取得重大突破，包括在日本整编部署首个海军陆战队濒海作战团、与澳大利亚启动一系列新的部队部署倡议、依据《加强防务合作协议》（EDCA）在菲律宾增加4个新的轮驻基地、与巴布亚新几内亚缔结《防务合作协议》（Defence Cooperation Agreement）和加强在朝鲜半岛的战略威慑。
Strategically, the US's latest developments of defense cooperation with the Philippines and Papua New Guinea carry great symbolic meaning, but in terms of military tactics and operations, the deployment adjustment of the US forces in its allies including Japan, Australia, and the ROK deserves more examination. In particular, those series of cooperation with Australia by the US, including more frequent and extended expeditionary visits by the US submarines under the AUKUS, increased rotation deployments of the US bombers and fighters, expanded cooperation between mutual maritime and ground troops, enhanced space and logistics cooperation, continuous upgrades of key bases, and the establishment of a submarine rotation force in Australia by 2027, all contribute significantly to enhance the presence and responsiveness of the US military on the Western Pacific fronts.
战略上，美军在菲律宾和巴布亚新几内亚的最新防务合作进展有很强的象征意义；但就军事战术和操作层面而言，美军在日本、澳大利亚和韩国等盟国的部署调整更值得关注。特别是与澳大利亚的系列合作，包括美国潜艇因奥库斯而进行更多和更长时间的远征访问，增加美军轰炸机和战斗机的轮换部署，扩大海上和地面部队的合作，加强太空和后勤合作，继续升级关键基地，以及到2027年在澳大利亚建立潜艇轮换部队等，这些对于提升美军在西太前沿的存在和反应能力有很大帮助。
By comparison, it is not difficult to see that despite strategic considerations given in the actions in the South Pacific region including the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, the US remains in the process of strategic layout and preparation. The country is unlikely to invest too many resources in these unstable regions in the short term, and the relevant deployment and presence in these areas will not significantly enhance the capabilities of the US military and change the regional deployment situation. Given the general backwardness and insufficient military capabilities of the Philippines, the US infrastructure in the Philippines features low persistence and high uncertainty in wartime. The existing investment and budgets in the Philippines are obviously not sufficient for the US to build these bases under the EDCA framework into real combat fortresses and forward bases.
两相比较不难看出，尽管美国在菲律宾和巴布亚新几内亚等南太地区的动作有战略谋划，但仍处于布局谋势阶段，短期内美国不太可能在这些不稳定地区投入过多的资源，在这些地区的部署及存在也不会大幅提升美军能力和改变区域的部署态势。囿于菲律宾基础设施的普遍落后和军事能力不足，在战时，美在菲的这些基地的持续性不强且不确定性很大。美国如果要想把EDCA框架下的这些基地打造成真正的“战斗堡垒”和“前进基地”，目前在菲的投入和预算显然是不够的。
In fact, since 2009, in the context of excessive anxiety over the so-called "China's maritime threats" and intense preoccupation with great power competition, the deployment of the US forces in the Pacific theater or the later "Indo-Pacific theater" has reached the brink of its capacity. At present, the air and sea forces deployed by the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) headquarters have accounted for more than 60% of the relevant US troop deployment around the world. Compared with 2009, their close-in surveillance against China has doubled, land-based large reconnaissance aircraft alone carry out more than 2,000 sorties each year, surface forces presence in key waters such as the South China Sea has grown nearly twice, and large-scale exercises have increased by nearly 50%. Due to the expensive and inefficient equipment manufacturing and procurement system, the number of major US maritime and air platforms has not increased significantly despite the record high annual defense budgets every year. More tasks have sacrificed the equipment and platform maintenance and personnel training scheduling, and disturbed the original deployment cycles of aircraft carrier strike groups, nuclear submarines, destroyers, fighter jets, and other major maritime and air platforms, leading to repeated incidence of significant accidents.
事实上，自2009年以来，在对所谓“中国海上威胁”过度焦虑和对大国竞争过度痴迷等背景下，美军太平洋战区或后来的印太战区所属兵力的部署已经濒临极限。当前，美军印太总部部署的海空兵力已经占美军全球相关兵力部署的60%以上。与2009年相比，针对中国的抵近侦察翻了一番，每年仅陆基大型侦察机就出动超过2000个架次，在南海等重点海域的水面力量存在也增长近一倍，大型演习增加了近50%。而由于美军装备制造和采购体系的成本和效率问题，尽管国防预算年年创新高，但美军主要海空平台的数量并没有发生显著的增长。为了完成越来越多的任务，装备和平台的维护以及人员培训都大打折扣，航母打击群、核潜艇、驱逐舰和战斗机等主要海空平台原有部署周期被打乱，大型事故频发。
The Pentagon and the USINDOPACOM headquarters are currently enhancing joint maritime situational awareness and equipment operability throughout the "Indo-Pacific' region, and it is precisely because they have seen their own incapabilities and limitations that they hope their allies and partners assume greater responsibilities and make greater contributions. However, except for its traditional hardcore allies like Japan and Australia, most countries cannot promptly generate significant aid to the US military owing to constraints in their capabilities and domestic politics.
眼下，五角大楼和美军印太总部在整个“印太”地区推动联合海域态势感知和装备的可操作性，正是看到自身能力的不足和局限性，才希望盟友及伙伴承担更大责任发挥更大作用。不过，除日本和澳大利亚这样的传统“铁杆”盟友，大多数国家由于能力和国内政治限制，并不能很快对美军形成大的助力。
To this end, even if the Pentagon sounds the trumpet of charge every day, the resulting bolstered strength for the "Indo-Pacific" Strategy is relatively limited, and the US military has shown excessive deployment and fatigue in this region. The fundamental dilemma facing the US is that its maritime superiority and dominance in the Western Pacific or the "Indo-Pacific" cannot be guaranteed due to the degrading relative strength. The country does not make corresponding policy adjustments but adopts offensive and expansive positioning, which is an unattainable goal.
因此，即便五角大楼天天奏响冲锋的号角，其能给予“印太战略”的力量增量却相对有限，美军在“印太”也已呈现过度部署和疲劳的态势。美军面临的根本困境是，其相对实力的下降已不足以维系在西太或“印太”地区的海上优势及主导权，而在政策层面不仅不做相应调整，还要采取进攻和扩张态势，这是不可能完成的任务。
The US strategic community knows clearly about this, and the only hope lies in the Fourth Industrial Revolution and disruptive technologies. The US is trying to widen the technological disparity with the Chinese military again through breakthroughs in scientific and technological innovation and revolutionary technologies. Before this situation arises, the Pentagon and the USINDOPACOM forces will be in a constant state of exhaustive scrambling.
美国战略界对此心知肚明，现在唯一能寄予厚望的就是第四次科技革命和颠覆性技术。美国试图通过科技创新和颠覆性技术方面的突破重新拉开与中国军队技术代际差距。不过在这种局面未出现之前，五角大楼和印太总部的美军都会长期处于疲于奔命的状态。
(The author is the director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative.)
（作者是“南海战略态势感知计划”主任）
Editor's note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
